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When I look at this age with the eye of a distant future, I find nothing
so remarkable in the man of the present day as his peculiar virtue and
sickness called “the historical sense.”
—Friedrich Nietzsche
The meaning of history (as a whole) and the meaning in history (of its
facts) underwent a revolution of no less significance than the revolu-
tion in the natural sciences. Again we wonder: how radical was this
break, what precisely was new in this “New Science”?
—Amos Funkenstein
Introduction
It is not, of course, a new suggestion to turn history on itself in order to
discover the historical conditions for the possibility of the modern historical
outlook. This project began in the early modern period, taking on a new direc-
tion and momentum with J. C. Gatterer’s complaint that his discipline had stu-
diously exempted itself from the methods it pioneered.1 Few recent contribu-
tors to this ongoing endeavor, perhaps, have undertaken as interesting or fun-
damental a version of it as the late Amos Funkenstein. As his student Abraham
Thanks to Ann Blair, for whose Harvard University seminar on early modern approaches to
history I originally wrote this paper up, and to Leora Batnitzky, Julian Bourg, Peter Eli Gordon,
Martin Jay, Abraham Socher, and a JHI reviewer for valuable advice.
1 “I do not know why this branch of learning has suffered the unfortunate fate of not having
admirers and practitioners who up to now ever thought of producing a HISTORY OF HISTORY worth
reading.” See Herbert Butterfield, Man on His Past: The Study of the History of Historical Schol-
arship (Cambridge, 1955; repr., Boston, 1960), 5; and Peter Hanns Reill, The Enlightenment and
the Rise of Historicism (Berkeley, 1975).
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P. Socher has recently observed, “One of Amos Funkenstein’s central historical
concerns was the development of the discipline and methods of history itself.”2
Nonetheless, Funkenstein’s contribution in this realm of inquiry remains little-
known and ill-understood; this paper attempts a critical overview of it.
Born in Palestine in 1937, Funkenstein died prematurely in 1995 after teach-
ing for more than two decades mainly at several Californian universities. Edu-
cated in postwar Germany, Funkenstein received his doctorate from the Free
University of Berlin in 1964 under the guidance of such teachers as Wilhelm
Berges, Reinhard Elze, Dieter Henrich, Adolf Leschnitzer, and Jacob Taubes.
After the publication of his dissertation, Heilsplan und natürliche Entwicklung:
Formen der Gegenwartsbestimmung im Geschichtsdenken des hohen Mittel-
alters (Munich, 1965), Funkenstein restricted himself mainly to the article form
until the publication of his landmark Christian Gauss lectures at Princeton Uni-
versity as Theology and the Scientific Imagination from the Middle Ages to the
Seventeenth Century (Princeton, 1986); in Jewish history, Perceptions of Jew-
ish History (Berkeley, 1993) collected his major articles to complement his
short volume on Maimonides: Nature, History, and Messianic Beliefs (Tel Aviv,
1998), a posthumous translation by Shmuel Himelstein of a Hebrew work of
1983.
Funkenstein, a confirmed adherent of the German style of Geistesgeschichte,
began his career with a dissertation dedicated, in part, to friendly criticism of
Karl Löwith’s Meaning in History, a study of the biblical, patristic, and medi-
eval lineage of the modern philosophy of history. And whatever the corrections
he offered to Löwith and the prior German discussion of the derivation of Western
historical thought Funkenstein never left behind many of the basic assumptions
of the discourse into which he initially entered.3 It is essential to understand
Funkenstein’s project as germinating in a particular place at a particular time,
postwar Germany. Nevertheless, contextualization may not exhaust the interest
of his argument, in part because Funkenstein offered a genealogy of the
contextualizing spirit itself. The predominant focus in what follows is, there-
fore, on the possible lessons and not on the obvious limitations of Funkenstein’s
account, idealistic, disembodied, and geistesgeschicht-lich though it always
remained. In what follows I do not try to verify historically (much less advo-
cate) the account Funkenstein generated; I aim only to reconstruct it and to
reflect on what it might add to more familiar and ingrained ways of thinking
about the historical backgrounds to history.
2 Abraham P. Socher, “Of Divine Cunning and Prolonged Madness: Amos Funkenstein on
Maimonides’ Historical Reasoning,” Jewish Social Studies, n.s., 6 (1999), 7.
3 Karl Löwith, Meaning in History: The Theological Implications of the Philosophy of His-
tory (Chicago, 1949). This study originally appeared in English, then in German as Weltgeschichte
und Heilsgeschehen: Die theologischen Voraussetzungen der Geschichts-philosophie, tr. Hanno
Kesting (Stuttgart, 1953). A set of very similar themes followed through time is to be found in
Frank E. Manuel, Shapes of Philosophical History (Stanford, 1965).
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The Unity of Two Versions of Historicism
In his dissertation Funkenstein cited as a methodological guide G. W. F.
Hegel’s dictum from the “Introduction” to his Lectures on the Philosophy of
History that “[i]n our language the term History unites the objective with the
subjective side, and denotes the res gestae quite as much the historia rerum
gestarum; in other words, it comprehends not less what has happened, than the
narration of what has happened.”4 The term “history” in English as well as in
Hegel’s German has two different referents. One is the “objective” res gestae,
the historical events themselves. The other is the “subjective” historia rerum
gestarum, their narrative representation. “This union of the two meanings,”
Hegel had gone on to note of the coincidence of two distinct acceptations in the
same word, “has to be regarded as of a higher order than mere outward acci-
dent”; for “[i]t is an internal vital principle common to both that produces them
simultaneously.”5
Out of allegiance to Hegel’s argument Funkenstein made the processes of
historical evolution of both the objective and subjective sides of modern his-
torical consciousness central subjects of his work. Hegel’s observation,
Funkenstein seems to have assumed, suggested that the “objective and subjec-
tive side” of history have to be considered and therefore chronicled together
because their fates had always been linked. But Funkenstein could not follow
up Hegel’s insight without in a sense reinventing it. For Hegel apparently re-
lied for his conclusion on the strange principle that all events worthy of the
name are recorded—both depend on the rise of the state—so that “history” as
event and “history” as report are necessarily congruent. If the subjective and
objective dimensions of history were to maintain the symbiotic relationship
Hegel attributed to them, then, Funkenstein would have to find a new explana-
tion of their interdependence.6
Hegel’s observation about the duality of “history” is repeated and brought
to a higher level today in a duality at the heart of the newer word “historicism.”
It is useful to think of Funkenstein’s project as an attempt to show that the two
contemporary meanings of “historicism,” one objective and one subjective, are
unified just as significantly—that is, non-coincidentally—as Hegel originally
claimed for the two meanings of “history.”
On the objective side, that of the res gestae, Funkenstein chronicled the
rise of the definition of historicism that, to avoid confusion, is in the Anglo-
4 G. W. F. Hegel, The Philosophy of History, tr. J. Sibree (New York, 1944), § 68.
5 Ibid., translation altered.
6 As Funkenstein explained early and late, the doctrine that events do not “count” unless
recorded—with the consequence that history only begins with the state—is considerably older
than Hegel’s philosophy. See Heilsplan, 76 and Perceptions, 3-4. Such views explain the other-
wise unintelligible word and concept of “prehistory.”
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American world sometimes called “the philosophy of history.” This version of
historicism involves a thesis about how the historical process is structured and
organized. It is the definition of the term given by Karl R. Popper in various
treatments and, climactically, in his book-length indictment of The Poverty of
Historicism.7 Popper’s notorious attack on Karl Marx and his communistic
votaries targeted their peculiar notion that history follows a foreordained script
or compulsive sequence—one given in advance and followed by actors even
when they are unaware of their participation in it. But what are the origins of
this conception of how the historical process is organized? Funkenstein made
this question one focal point of his investigations.
On the subjective side, that of the historia rerum gestarum, Funkenstein
singled out for explanation the other, more canonical definition of historicism,
the one that describes not the substantive organization of the historical process
but rather the methodological principle of the historian’s craft. This principle
holds that epochs differ fundamentally from one another and have to be under-
stood in their own terms. Each age is “equally immediate to God,” as Leopold
von Ranke expressed it in a famous apothegm. This conception is sometimes
thought to have a substantive component, presuming the “individuality” of each
historical moment or epoch. But it has a methodological thrust, for it suggests
that the only understanding of a historical datum—text or event—is a contex-
tual one, anchored in the difference and particularity of a singular time. But
what are the origins of this methodological conception of how the past is to be
understood by the historian?8 Funkenstein made this question a second focal
point of his work.
It has been observed by many writers that the rivalry between the defini-
tions of historicism is so dangerous because they refer not merely to different
but to opposite conceptions. Where the one definition fastens on the particular-
ity of every historical moment and separates it from all the rest, the alternative
definition binds each historical moment to every other so that they combine to
add up to a complete master-script of time. Where the one separates every
moment from the entire historical process, the other subsumes each within it.
So defined, it seems hard to advocate both consistently. But following Hegel,
7 Karl R. Popper, The Poverty of Historicism (Boston, 1957).
8 On the term, see Dwight N. Lee and Robert N. Beck, “The Meaning of ‘Historicism,’ ”
American Historical Review, 59 (1953-54), 568-77; and Georg G. Iggers, “Historicism: The
History and Meaning of the Term,” JHI, 56 (1995), 129-52. The most capacious attempt to
historicize the rise of the new methodological consciousness is Friedrich Meinecke, Die Entstehung
des Historismus (2 vols., Munich, 1936), which appeared in English as Historism: The Rise of a
New Historical Outlook, tr. J. E. Anderson (New York, 1972). The major discussions of histori-
cism as philosophical, theological, and cultural quandary took place in early twentieth-century
Germany in the context of what Ernst Troeltsch labeled the “crisis” of historicism. See Troeltsch,
“Die Krisis des Historismus,” Die Neue Rundschau, 33 (1922), 572-90 and Annette Wittkau,
Historismus: zur Geschichte des Begriffs und des Problems (Göttingen, 1992).
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whose philosophy had perhaps gone furthest in combining both conceptions,9
Funkenstein tried to explain why these apparent opposites shared more than
just their name.
It is true, of course, that other scholars, preeminently Karl Löwith, had
attempted to historicize the philosophy of history before. The central novelty
of Funkenstein’s effort, I believe, is to have done so without leaving out the rise
of the other kind of historicism which likewise made Hegel’s approach so pow-
erful. The key to the relationship between the two kinds of historicism, the one
objective and the other subjective, lay in the fact that they emerged together—
or so, at least, Funkenstein argued. They became bitter rivals only late in the
day, but in their origins they were inseparable.
Historicism as Teleology
The first kind of historicism, involving the attribution of a singular ruling
meaning and purpose to time, is considerably older than the other one—in-
deed, if Funkenstein is correct, it made the other possible. The teleological
philosophy of history Funkenstein traced back to the very foundational periods
of Western monotheism and, more specifically, to the Hebrew prophets. It is
with this ancient material that Funkenstein began his dissertation, Heilsplan
und natürliche Entwicklung, very early establishing to his satisfaction the fun-
damentals of a story to which he constantly returned.
In his dissertation Funkenstein joined the general drift of this literature in
tracing what Erich Auerbach called the biblical discovery of “the concept of
the historically becoming.”10 The Hebrew Bible as a whole depends on novel
conceptions of historical time insofar as the Israelites understood themselves
as a youthful and novel sect. But it is—so Funkenstein argued—thanks to the
later prophets of the subjugated people that the historical sense is truly born. In
the admonitions and promises of Hebrew apocalyptical figures, one could find
a kind of detailed temporal imagination, to be taken up into early Christianity,
that made possible the very notion of history as the purposive unfolding of time
towards an end state. For they claimed that the end of time itself is already
appointed and in the process of coming to pass according to a carefully or-
dained schedule. All history is future history. “The fascination with historical
time and its structure,” Funkenstein wrote, counted as the
9 See Frederick C. Beiser, “Hegel’s Historicism,” in Beiser (ed.), The Cambridge Compan-
ion to Hegel (Cambridge, 1993), and esp. Michael N. Forster, Hegel’s Idea of a “Phenomenol-
ogy of Spirit” (Chicago, 1998), Part III.
10 Erich Auerbach, Mimesis: Dargestellte Wirklichkeit in der abendländische Literatur (Ber-
lin, 1946), in English, Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in Western Literature, tr. Willard
R. Trask (Princeton, 1953), 23.
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important contribution of the apocalyptic mentality to the Western sense
of history. The apocalyptician grasped all of history as a structured,
well-articulated meaningful unity. [He gave a] detailed account of the
future drama of the end, down to days, hours, and precise actors, [based
on] his perception of the whole of history as a dramatic struggle be-
tween the forces of good and evil.11
In this frame of thought the “very powerlessness of Israel” looked paradoxi-
cally to be
proof of God’s immense power, which manifests itself by his using the
biggest empires, Assyria, Babylon and Egypt, as “the rod of his wrath”
... to chastise Israel and to purify it. Yet these world-powers are un-
aware of it, of their historical mission..., and attribute their success to
their very own strength and their God’s. Here, perhaps, we encounter
the earliest, original version of reading into the history “the cunning of
God” or “the cunning reason,” ... [since] by following their own, blind
urge for power, the nations of the world unknowingly serve a higher
design.12
Already, Funkenstein seemed to imply, Hegel is on the horizon. As Yosef
Yerushalmi later expressed the same point, “If Herodotus was the father of
history, the fathers of meaning in history were the Jews.”13
In beginning with this material in his dissertation Funkenstein appears to
have taken Löwith’s Meaning in History as his point of departure. A citation to
the German edition of Löwith’s book appears in the very first footnote of
Funkenstein’s career of many footnotes.14 Though written in exile before Löwith
had returned to the University of Heidelberg from America to take up his com-
manding position in the postwar German academy, The Meaning of History is,
like Funkenstein’s later work, anomalous only where it appeared in print and
not in the geographical and academic culture in which it originated in spirit.
The comparative strength of theology in the German universities had led to a
veritable obsession, from the later Wilhelmine to the postwar periods, with the
relation between “Christianity and culture.” The immediate post-World War II
moment saw a spate of works about the theological origins of historical rea-
son.15 Funkenstein’s teacher, Jacob Taubes, established a trend when he pub-
11 Funkenstein, Perceptions, 77.
12 Ibid., 54 (note omitted); cf. 72-73 and Theology, 243-50.
13 Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi, Zakhor: Jewish History and Jewish Memory (Seattle, 1982), 8.
14 See Funkenstein, Heilsplan und natürliche Entwicklung, 123, n. 1.
15 See Oscar Cullmann, Christ and Time: The Primitive Christian Conception of Time and
History, tr. Floyd V. Filson (Philadelphia, 1950); Karl Jaspers, The Origin and Goal of History,
tr. Marcus Bullock (New Haven, 1953); and Eric Voegelin, The New Science of Politics: An
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lished his Western Eschatology, an idiosyncratic account of the development of
the philosophy of history written in a vatic style, covering similar material
from the ancient Israelites to Karl Marx and suggesting the impossibility of
understanding the historicity of particular events without grasping the deeper
and more profound “possibility of history.” In a book that matched Löwith’s in
range and theme, Taubes posed a question that Funkenstein in a far more nu-
anced, careful, and historical mode preserved and transmitted to American read-
ers unaware—perhaps to their benefit—that history is a problem.16 German
conservatives, in these years, wrote of living in a “posthistorical” epoch, and in
a Cold War world they dismissed Communism as the transparent but perverted
secularization of a theological, chiliastic design that remained delusionally an-
chored in the myth of progress and redemption in history.17 Löwith’s book ar-
gued the need to retreat from the modern historical consciousness that Friedrich
Nietzsche had tried and failed to master, on the grounds that “there has never
been and never will be an immanent solution of the problem of history, for
man’s historical experience is one of steady failure.”18
Funkenstein’s most important claim to originality in relation to this older
German (as well as to contemporary Anglo-American) discussion is to have
studied historicism as a teleology without neglecting historicism as methodol-
ogy, a move essentially without precedent in Löwith, Taubes, and others. Still,
Funkenstein clearly hoped to affiliate with (and criticize from within) the project
of finding the theological origins of teleological modes of thought that Löwith
had made so compelling. Consequently, Funkenstein’s dissertation, which ends
with medieval historians, is chiefly devoted to their theological sources, begin-
ning with biblical prophecy.
Introduction (Chicago, 1952), esp. chap. 4.; also Hans Urs von Balthasar, A Theology of History
(New York, 1950); and Josef Pieper, The End of Time: A Meditation on the Philosophy of His-
tory, tr. Bullock (New York, 1954). See Carl Schmitt’s review of Löwith’s book, “Drei Stufen
historischer Sinngebung,” Universitas, 5 (1950), 927-31, and Leo Strauss, Natural Right and
History (Chicago, 1953), 25.
16 Jakob Taubes, Abendländische Eschatologie (Berne, 1947; rpt. Munich, 1991), on which
see Reinhard Mehring, “Karl Löwith, Carl Schmitt, Jacob Taubes, und das ‘Ende der Geschichte,’ ”
Zeitschrift für Religions- und Geistesgeschichte, 48 (1996), 231-48; and Richard Faber, Eveline
Goodman-Thau, and Thomas Macho (eds.), Abendländische Eschatologie: Ad Jacob Taubes
(Würzburg, 2001).
17 See Lutz Niethammer, Posthistoire: Is History at an End?, tr. Patrick Camiller (London,
1992).
18 Löwith, Meaning in History, 191. See Jürgen Habermas, “Karl Löwith: Stoic Retreat
from Historical Consciousness,” in Philosophical-Political Profiles, tr. Frederick G. Lawrence
(Cambridge, Mass., 1983), Jeffrey Andrew Barash, “The Sense of History: On the Political Im-
plications of Karl Löwith’s Interpretation of Secularization,” History and Theory, 37 (1998), 69-
82, and Richard Wolin, Heidegger’s Children: Hannah Arendt, Karl Löwith, Hans Jonas, and
Herbert Marcuse (Princeton, 2001), chap. 4.
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Since Funkenstein never left this idealist historiography behind, restricting
himself to criticizing it from within, his own beginnings are fundamental to
understanding not only his contribution but also its potential limits. His disser-
tation, which focuses more than his later writings on the early parts of the evo-
lution of Western historical consciousness, could nevertheless claim several
advances on Löwith’s work. In the first place it is more detailed. Fun-kenstein’s
early study shared the same ultimate horizon in the nineteenth-century philoso-
phy of history. But where Löwith had simply examined the high points of the
trajectory, leaping from the Bible to Augustine and his student Orosius and
from there to Joachim of Fiore before an unceremonious entry into the early
modern period, Funkenstein’s doctoral work dwelled at greater length and with
greater discernment on the early stages of the development of the notion of
reason in history, before Joachim’s transformative intervention, leaving the
pursuit of the story into the early modern and modern periods for later works.
But Funkenstein’s dissertation made another, substantive advance on
Löwith’s work. In the preparatory section of his dissertation concerning the
“ancient foundations” Funkenstein claimed the major innovation of distinguish-
ing sharply between what he called “apocalyptics” and “eschatology.” Löwith,
Funkenstein suggested, had missed this critical difference. Where apocalyptics
had insisted on the imminence of the parousia, eschatology had to suppress the
apocalyptic impulse in order to postpone the end of history indefinitely into the
future. The reason for this maneuver is that failures of predictions of the First
(for the Jews) or Second Coming (for the Christians) had to be converted from
a source of embarrassment into a result intended from the outset. The central
argument Funkenstein made is thus that the two approaches to history were not
truly continuous. Instead, eschatology had to be invented through the departure
from apocalyptics, so that the “revolutionary” consciousness had to become
“evolutionary.” The implication of this argument—one made with striking si-
multaneity by the philosopher Hans Blumenberg in his defense of the modern
age—is that the eschatology secularized in the early modern period had itself
originally been an agent of secularization: a means of accommodating reli-
gions of impatient expectation to a world that disappointingly refused to end.
Not apocalyptics but eschatology made the maturation of Western historical
reasoning possible.19
After the establishment of this point much of the rest of Funkenstein’s dis-
sertation is dedicated to medieval theology and historiography—chiefly in the
eleventh and twelfth centuries—and the sense in which it both resumed and
19 In his book, Blumenberg made the claim that Christianity had already been “secularized”
well before modern times and therefore could not claim any special purity from secularization.
See Hans Blumenberg, Die Legitimität der Neuzeit (Frankfurt, 1966), 32-39. This work appeared
later in English as The Legitimacy of the Modern Age, tr. Robert M. Wallace (Cambridge, Mass.,
1983).
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detailed the initial eschatological scripts left over especially from the patristic
authors. It would take too long to summarize the many facets Funkenstein
claimed to unveil and it is in any case unnecessary for my purposes.20 Various
writers came to see history not only as evolutionary but also gradualistic as
well as progressive. The slow maturation of the world in the “middle” ages
came to be likened to the natural life of a biological person in which the present
is always somewhere in between beginning and ending. The appearance of
misdirection or decline in history various philosophers explained away as the
mysterious workings of providence, intentional in God’s mind even when they
surpassed the merely human understanding. The conclusion of central impor-
tance for this paper is that the Middle Ages had, so Funkenstein argued, a ma-
ture sense of the operations of God in the historical process—what Maimonides
called, in a phrase that Funkenstein saw as a clear if distant anticipation of
Hegel, “God’s cunning.”21
Each chapter of Funkenstein’s magnum opus Theology and the Scientific
Imagination is devoted to the early modern secularization of a divine attribute.
In his treatment of the origins of the modern historical attitude from God’s
providence Funkenstein returned to finish the story he began in his dissertation
on the origins of the teleological interpretation of the sweep of time. The story
culminated in Vico’s conception of providence, which fully internalized (for
the gentiles at least) God’s intention to the orderly unfolding of the historical
process, making it the outcome if not of man’s intention then at least of man’s
creative activity. “Thus,” Funkenstein concluded,
“providence” came to signify man’s emancipation from nature or even
from God, the spontaneity of his social endeavors.... With the help of
this version of a List der Vernunft, Vico can reintroduce providence
into history and thus resume, on a richer base, a tradition of Christian
philosophy of history ... seeking to establish the correspondence be-
tween the divine plan of salvation and the immanent nature of man.
But Vico also made the figure of thought available for those who would cast
historical evolution as a wholly human activity, even if it is to be fully under-
stood only from the end of the process, when the philosopher can let fly the
Owl of Minerva at dusk.22
20 See Funkenstein, Heilsplan, Parts II and III and Theology, 243-75.
21 See Funkenstein, Heilsplan, 169 n. 17, Theology, chap. 4, esp. 232; Perceptions, 131-55;
Maimonides, §§ 3-10. A crucial point of inspiration for much of Funkenstein’s project may well
have been the attempt by his teacher to find anticipations of Hegel in another medieval thinker.
See Funkenstein, Theology, 236, n. 52, and Wilhelm Berges, “Anselm von Haverberg in der
Geistesgeschichte des 12. Jahrhunderts,” Jahrbuch für Geschichte Mittel und Ostdeutsch-landsm,
5 (1956), 52.
22 Funkenstein, Theology, 288. Cf. António Pérez-Ramos, “And Justify the Ways of God to
Men,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 21 (1990), 323-39. It has proved difficult for
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Historicism as Methodology
Funkenstein’s main achievement, however, is not to have intervened in the
“secularization debate” about the origins of modern teleologies out of theologi-
cal scripts; it is his argument that the historical method itself has to be under-
stood, in important part, as a historical byproduct of the secularization pro-
cess.23 Already Funkenstein’s dissertation, in its most important difference from
Löwith, Blumenberg, and other secularization theorists, is fundamentally inter-
ested in the implications of historical scripts for understanding historical prac-
tice; it turns from the theological materials in the early part of the book to
concrete examples of medieval historical writing in figures such as Rodolfus
Glaber, Frutolf of Michelsberg, Hugh of Fleury, and Otto of Freising. But
Funkenstein refused to restrict his sense of the linkage to the medieval period.
The chapter he wrote on the secularization of God’s providence in Theology
and the Scientific Imagination is a detailed portrait of the connection between
the secularization of theology and the rise of the modern historical method.
It may not seem surprising that the philosophy of history, even when only
nascent in the form of theodicy, should have compelled some awareness that
different periods are characterized by distinct mentalities. But Funkenstein made
this hypothesis the source of a rich historical investigation into the origins of
modern historicism. For this reason he sought the origins of methodological
historicism, in the sense of distinction of different ages from one another, not
only in their political actors but in their more fundamental social understand-
ings, in the theological discovery of history in general. If his hypothesis is
correct, one should expect to be able to find a nascent methodological con-
sciousness of historical difference long before the early modern period.
Funkenstein considered the dominant classical and medieval impulse to be
the separation of “historical facts” from “historical context.” In his words, “for
ancient or medieval authors, historical facts were, so to say, atomic entities that
are immediately perceivable and understandable, and hardly in need of inter-
pretation.” By contrast “[i]n the modern perception, no historical fact is in and
of itself meaningful: only its context endows a historical fact with meaning and
significance.”24 Funkenstein claimed that a proto-historicist outlook is to be
social theory to rescue the notion that man makes his own history from the notion that he will
nonetheless make it according to a providential script. See Roberto Mangabeira Unger, Politics:
A Work in Constructive Social Theory (3 vols.; Cambridge, 1987), esp. I, 135-43.
23 Funkenstein noted that “[e]lsewhere I tried to show that Hans Blumenberg’s model does
not work sufficiently well to explain what he intended to explain.” Funkenstein, “Response,”
History & Memory, 4 (1992), 148. He presumably referred to Theology and the Scientific Imagi-
nation, but there is no explicit polemic with Blumenberg in that book. The present article does
not attempt to determine Funkenstein’s place in the secularization debate.
24 Funkenstein, Perceptions, 24-25; he pioneered this argument in Heilsplan, 70-77 (“Die
mittelalterliche Anschauung vom historischen Faktum”); but cf. Lorraine J. Daston and Katharine
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discovered in a great number of domains, but he stressed law in both Christian
and Jewish traditions as a particularly rich source. In legal reasoning, Funken-
stein remarked of the Jewish discussion that one can “find clear distinctions of
time and place throughout: distinctions concerning customs and their context,
exact knowledge of the place and time of the messages and teachers of halakha,
the estimated monetary value of coins mentioned in sources, the significance
of institutions of the past.” But the same observation applied to the Christian
milieux, so that “[t]he degree of historical awareness of the commentators and
creators of the halakha was approximately the same as the degree of historical
awareness of the interpreters of Roman law in the Middle Ages prior to the
development of the mos gallicus.”25 But legal texts of the period were for
Funkenstein “only one of the many instances of thinking about history [for] the
exegetical, homiletic, and philosophical literature abound with them.”26
Instead of concentrating most assiduously on the law, however, Funkenstein
furthered his thesis at greatest length in his history of the “principle of accom-
modation” generally and through a study of the use which the medieval phi-
losopher Maimonides made of it specifically. Accommodation is the theologi-
cal notion that because humans live in historical time, God’s timeless mind is
“adjusted” to suit their particular level of development. Because “the Scrip-
tures speak the language of man,” as a rabbinic formula had it, God’s word had
to be interpreted not literally but through transposition to the age to which
evolution had brought humankind. This principle, though initially a legal tool,
came to have widespread exegetical and philosophical use in both Jewish and
Christian culture.27 More important, it suggested a proto-historicist outlook long
before the historicist innovations of the early modern period.
Funkenstein’s nearly obsessive repetition and elaboration of this argument
led him again and again to Maimonides as an exemplar of the theological ori-
gins of historicism. His specific example is Maimonides’s theory of the “rea-
sons for the commandments” (ta’amei ha’mitzvot). For example, the Bible com-
mands certain sacrifices, a practice which Jews ever since the destruction of
the Temple have renounced. In light of this shift Maimonides is compelled to
explain why the commandment to sacrifice is fitting only in certain historical
circumstances only—why God required it not as a timeless duty but rather as a
Park, Wonders and the Order of Nature, 1150-1750 (New York, 1998), chap. 6; Peter Dear,
Discipline and Experience: The Mathematical Way in the Scientific Revolution (Chicago, 1995);
and Barbara J. Shapiro, A Culture of Fact: England, 1550-1720 (Ithaca, 2000).
25 Funkenstein, Perceptions, 17.
26 Funkenstein, “Response,” 147.
27 See Funkenstein, “Gesetz und Geschichte: zur historisierenden Hermeneutik bei Moses
Maimonides und Thomas von Aquin,” Viator, 1 (1970), 147-78; “Periodization and Self-Under-
standing in the Middle Ages and Early Modern Times,” Medievalia et Humanistica, n.s., 5 (1974),
3-23; also Stephen D. Benin, The Footprints of God: Accommodation in Jewish and Christian
Thought (Albany, 1993), originally a dissertation written under Funkenstein’s supervision.
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temporary necessity. The cultic mentality of the biblical context demanded cer-
tain practices, Maimonides suggested, in an argument that (whether or not his-
torically correct) documents an awareness of the relative integrity of each age
and an ability to imagine historical evolution from one age to another. The
main thrust of Funkenstein’s analysis is that a theological imperative led al-
most necessarily to the development of a nuanced sense of the difference in
collective mentalities from place to place and from age to age. While God may
not evolve in history, man does.28
The consequences for historical understanding were immense. Eventually,
Funkenstein claimed, the principle of accommodation matured into the meth-
odological recognition that deep historical differences obtain between periods,
with profound implications for how they are to be interpreted. This “revolu-
tion” occurred in the early modern period. As Funkenstein wrote:
Again it was Vico who first gave systematic expression to most facets
of [the] methodological revolution. A new concept of historical peri-
ods as dynamical contexts emerges from his writings: it consists of the
demand and of the serious attempt to determine historical periods from
within, through some internal, integrating principle....29
Thus, historicism as a methodological assumption reached maturity in the
thought of the same figure who likewise appeared to complete the seculariza-
tion of historicism as a substantive teleology.
In an essay published in a collection he dedicated to Funkenstein’s memory,
Carlo Ginzburg has recently endorsed the essence of Funkenstein’s account.
“The kernel of the current historiographical paradigm,” he has concluded, “is a
secularized version of the model of accommodation.”30 As Funkenstein con-
tended, methodological historicism developed for centuries in a theological
matrix. During this time it figured as an adjunct of the other, substantive kind
of historicism. Funkenstein’s main contribution to the origins of the modern
historical outlook is thus an argument regarding what one could term “the theo-
logical origins of historicism.” In a recent publication Allan Megill has plausi-
bly stressed “the extent to which the crisis of historicism had its roots in theol-
ogy and religion, not in historiography or philosophy.” The implication of
Funkenstein’s study is that it is, ironically, not only the crisis of historicism but
28 See Funkenstein, Theology, 222-43.
29 Funkenstein, Theology, 209. He claimed that Vico illuminated rather than influenced
developments: “Vico’s impact was negligible. But his main themes maintain a regulative role in
the formation of modern historical reasoning” (ibid., 212).
30 Ginzburg, Wooden Eyes: Nine Reflections on Distance, tr. Martin Ryle and Kate Soper
(New York, 2001), 155.
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historicism itself that had roots in theology and religion, not in historiography
or philosophy.31
Early Modern Secularization
Were Funkenstein’s argument about the original interdependence of the
two historicisms to become plausible, it would necessarily force a renewed
appreciation of the significance of early modern historical thought. Befitting
his professional specialty as a medievalist, Funkenstein argued that both the
objective and subjective senses of history that appeared in Hegel’s thought had
their origins very deep in Western history and came to fruition in the medieval
period: the main significance of the early modern era, according to his grand
theory, is that they were secularized together, paving the way for Vico, Kant,
and Hegel.
Funkenstein did not “leap” from medieval Jewish and Christian sources to
early modern historicism. Instead, a chapter of his Theology and the Scientific
Imagination is expressly dedicated to charting the path across this divide. On
the objective side Funkenstein concentrated on the perception that the view of
society and history as self-regulating—a view offered by a whole host of early
modern thinkers, including Bernard Mandeville, Adam Smith, and Giambattista
Vico, to say nothing of the later German Idealists like Immanuel Kant and
Hegel himself—looked to be a secularized medieval theodicy. They retained
the religious notion of history as an unfolding of God’s plan, but they replaced
God with reason:
The objectives of reason are realized obliquely. Without being an in-
strument, the historical agent acts as one by following [God’s] will.
Only to the subjective consciousness do subjective freedom and objec-
tive necessity appear to be in conflict. In the Zeitgeist of each phase
they coincide; the growing insight into their coincidence constitutes
the progress in the objective consciousness of freedom. This very me-
diation of freedom and necessity is “the cunning of reason.”32
Like Löwith, Funkenstein went on to contend that the view of history as pos-
sessing an immanent purpose counted not as new in the early modern period
but rather as very old. Only the impersonality of the intention—attributed even-
tually by Hegel to spirit and reason—seemed new; it somehow replaced the
31 Allan Megill, “Why Was There a Crisis of Historicism?” (review of Charles R. Bambach,
Heidegger, Dilthey, and the Crisis of Historicism [Ithaca, 1995]), History and Theory, 36 (1997),
419; also Thomas A. Howard, Religion and the Rise of Historicism: W.M.L. de Wette, Jacob
Burckhardt, and the Theological Origins of Nineteenth-Century Historical Consciousness (Cam-
bridge, 2000).
32 Funkenstein, Theology, 204.
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originally divine intention behind the authorship of the script of history. The
visible hand became invisible.
On the subjective side the early modern period saw what Funkenstein called
“a revolution ... that was no less radical than the concurrent scientific revolu-
tion.” This upheaval
brought about a new contextual understanding of history, in which [a]
historical fact became “understood” or meaningful only through the
context in which it is embedded. This applies to both historical texts
and any other monument of the past. The historian must reconstruct
the context, and the reconstruction is always linked to his or her “point
of view” in the present.33
But the crux of Funkenstein’s project is nonetheless to insist that this revolu-
tion did not occur either instantaneously or without important ancient and me-
dieval preparation. As he remarks, Aristarchus of Samos already “formulated
the basic interpretative rule that Homer should be explained by Homer alone.”34
Funkenstein’s purpose, however, is not only to name precursors but also to
propose an argument why and how the historical revolution could have oc-
curred. He is certainly aware of the major and standard works on the early
modern transformation of the historical sensibility that prepared the notion that
culture is a totality—one, as Ranke eventually held, intelligible only in its own
terms. Invoking the centrality of the neo-Romanist mos gallicus, innovations in
biblical research, and humanist textual study (as epitomized by Lorenzo Valla’s
erudition) that have received the lion’s share of attention in Anglo-American
scholarship of the last generation, Funkenstein allowed that “[l]egal scholar-
ship, biblical criticism, and classical philology were the main bearers of the
new historical method: history writing lagged considerably behind.”35 Still,
Funkenstein considered those “bearers” of the new historical sensibility only
part of the story.
This argument is perhaps the most critical implication of Funkenstein’s
account for students of the rise of the historical outlook because it is so foreign
to the Anglo-American approach to understanding the origins of the historicist
mood. It is clear that Funkenstein deeply respected, and internalized to his nar-
33 Funkenstein, Perceptions, 14-15.
34 Ibid., 9 n. 19; cf. 17.
35 See Funkenstein, Theology, 205-13 at 212 and Perceptions, 25-27, where he cites J. G. A.
Pocock, The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law: A Study of English Historical Thought in
the Sixteenth Century (Cambridge, 1957), chap. 1; Julian H. Franklin, Jean Bodin and the Six-
teenth-Century Revolution in the Methodology of Law and History (New York, 1963); and Donald
R. Kelley, Foundations of Modern Historical Scholarship: Language, Law, and History in the
French Renaissance (New York, 1970). Pocock’s dissertation has subsequently been reprinted
(Cambridge, 1987) with a long retrospect.
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rative, the work on early modern European development of historical thought
inspired by J. G. A. Pocock’s landmark The Ancient Constitution and the Feu-
dal Law and continued so educationally by his followers in charting the secu-
lar, humanist, and legal origins of modern historical methodologies. Funkenstein
contended, however, that it is a distortion not to place these origins of historical
thought in a wider frame. Where the dominant Anglo-American view casts
Renaissance humanism and its sequels as standing largely alone in making the
historicism of the modern outlook possible, Funkenstein argued that it func-
tioned at best as a catalyst in the further development of a much older and
longer process. Pocock, in various writings, gave the dominant view an espe-
cially philosophical cast in his argument that only Renaissance humanism could
grasp historical particularity because it refused the emphasis on timeless uni-
versality of medieval thought and grounded life in the “moment.” This view
normally led in his work to a stark differentiation of humanism from what came
before.36 Funkenstein’s model suggests that this distinction is typically over-
drawn. Since the continuities between sacred and secular and medieval and
modern are far more significant than the dominant view is often willing to
allow, no persuasive account can omit them.
A main objective of Funkenstein’s argument, then, is to suggest what trans-
formation is wrought on the study of early modern historical thought when the
revolution in historical methods is not kept artificially isolated and insulated
from the study of the transformations of historical consciousness more broadly,
so that the “subjective” side of history that underwent a revolution in the early
modern period always has to be considered together with the “objective.” Ac-
cording to Funkenstein, both kinds of historicism have theological origins. For
in Hegel’s words “It is an internal vital principle common to both that produces
them simultaneously.”
From Modern Separation to Modernist Crisis
Funkenstein’s main achievement is to have insisted on the connection be-
tween historical scheme and method, a connection for which he argued begin-
36 See esp. Pocock, Politics, Language, and Time: Essays on Political Thought and History
(New York, 1971), 80-85, for an entirely unguarded argument to this effect and The Machiavel-
lian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton,
1975), Part I. On this period, Funkenstein’s contribution is far more in the spirit of Adelbert
Klempt’s Die Säkularisierung der universalhistorischen Auffassung: zum Wandel des
Geschichtsdenkens im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert (Göttingen, 1960), a work he knew, than the
restrictedly secular Anglo-American scholarship he hoped to supplement. Ironically, Butterfield,
the teacher in whose thought Pocock’s work in this area is rooted, showed himself far more
aware of the pioneering German-language discussion on the topic and, as a committed Christian
thinker, may have been more open to the notion of a theological background to modern histori-
ography. Butterfield’s Man on His Past is littered with references to the Wilhelmine and Weimar
discussion, for example, Hans Proesler, Das Problem einer Entwicklungsgeschichte des
historischen Sinnes (Berlin, 1920).
64.4moyn. 2/6/04, 10:22 AM653
Samuel Moyn654
ning in his dissertation. If Funkenstein’s approach is correct, the study of the
development of historical consciousness commits one to a far more general—
and admittedly more elusive—inquiry than the study of the progress of histori-
cal methodology would by itself. Nonetheless, if the hypothesis that historical
methodology presupposes historical consciousness proves sustainable, then it
turns out to be a necessary inquiry. For then it does not necessarily follow that
the best place to look for the conditions for revolutions in historical thought is
in the books of history or the practices of historians alone. For the method-
ological self-awareness of the history books and writers of a one period may
depend on the historical consciousness nurtured in quite unrelated sources be-
fore.
Yet Funkenstein left open the question how the connection between the
two historicisms came to be severed, and their prior relationship obscured, in
the modern historian’s consciousness. It is on this point that I would like to
argue for a tension and a gap in Funkenstein’s account. At some point, that
account implies, the substantive and methodological versions of historicism
reached a fateful point of separation. The “increased sense of the actual histori-
cal interdependence of institutions and the events within a period” initially origi-
nated out of “the evolutionary sense of an almost necessary sequence of peri-
ods.”37 But in a reversal that shattered their original interdependence, these two
insights subsequently became detached from one another. Strangely, Funkenstein
did not explain how the historical sense became able to operate independently
of the theological, eschatological framework which originally helped make it a
possibility.
The existence and importance of this gap comes to seem more obvious as
soon as one examines Funkenstein’s writings more closely. For even as he con-
sistently implied the original interdependence of the two kinds of historicism,
he just as consistently separated his attempts to historicize them. The separa-
tion is especially clear in the various accounts Funkenstein gave of Maimonides,
who figures in some places as a progenitor of dialectical materialism in his
view of a necessaritarian and compulsive sequence of stages in history but
appears in others as a precursor of the historical school in his view of the au-
tonomy of discrete moments in time as meaningful wholes.38 But it turns out
that Funkenstein’s explanatory separation of the two kinds of historicism from
one another pervades his work. It seems that Funkenstein adopted composi-
tionally the very distinction between the two historicisms that he denied con-
ceptually.
It is possible that Funkenstein made the choice to separate the two histori-
cisms simply in the interests of clear explanation, but there exists an alternative
37 Funkenstein, Theology, 268.
38 Cf. Funkenstein, Perceptions, 141-44 and 145-47.
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possibility, which is that he did not take seriously enough the conceptual im-
miscibility of the proto-teleological and the proto-historicist approaches to the
past even when they were most unified. How is it, when they enjoyed an origi-
nal fraternity, that the two historicisms could have later become such deadly
opposites? The ultimate viability of Funkenstein’s account, then, would turn on
the availability of a plausible story of how the harmonious partnership became
a hostile split. Why and how did the breakdown occur? Did it have to happen?
Could it have been avoided?
These questions may not have seemed so pressing in the years that
Funkenstein’s project took root, but from the present standpoint, it may well
seem like the origins of the catastrophic dissolution of the historicisms in the
nineteenth century demand more attention. In his history of history Funkenstein
aimed to historicize the unity of the two historicisms in Hegel’s thought; but he
did not effectively acknowledge—much less historically explain—the breakup
of this unity, the “crisis of historicism” that Friedrich Nietzsche predicted and
that soon occurred, and the alternative ways philosophers and philosophically-
minded historians have since proposed to respond to this crisis down to the
present day.39 Funkenstein focused on a moment of reconciliation in taking
Hegel as the endpoint of his story. In light of the agony of dissolution that
ensued the history of history may well deserve a more tragic rendition than
Funkenstein could give it by leaving the last acts out.
It is worthwhile to note, moreover, that Funkenstein’s omission of a plau-
sible story of the separation appears to leave his argument for the continuity of
historical writing and historical consciousness with an important gap. The ar-
gument that the story of historical practice presupposes his own story of “his-
torical consciousness” provided the crux of the well-known controversy which
Funkenstein initiated against Yerushalmi. Even if the Jews did not write his-
tory, Funkenstein claimed, it by no means implied that they lacked historical
awareness. Funkenstein claimed that his usage of “historical consciousness” as
a “mediating category” between professional history and collective memory
made the novelty of nineteenth-century Jewish historicism far less emphatic
and unprecedented than Yerushalmi had supposed. It is not the worth of histori-
cal consciousness as a “mediating category” between history and memory that
Funkenstein’s omission leaves fragile; instead, the gap may undermine
Funkenstein’s attempt to offer the existence of that category by itself as evi-
dence that the nature of historical consciousness did not change fundamentally
39 See Bambach, Heidegger, Dilthey, and the Crisis of Historicism for a clear study of Mar-
tin Heidegger’s attempt to overcome the relativistic crisis of values that followed from the Ger-
man historical school. See also Barash, Martin Heidegger and the Problem of Historical Mean-
ing (Dordrecht, 1988). Inadequate is Funkenstein’s occasional suggestion that his argument ex-
plained the emergence of “universal hermeneutics,” a philosophy that developed as a result of
the crisis of historicism and its thorough regrounding in the work of Heidegger and Hans-Georg
Gadamer.
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in the modern period. Differently put, Funkenstein’s argument against
Yerushalmi allowed a methodological distinction to accomplish too much sub-
stantive work, since the fact that history and memory are two forms of a more
generalized historical consciousness by no means alters the fact that the dis-
tance between them became great enough for this deeper unity to be obscured
in modern times. If it is with a prestigious, autonomous, and secular histori-
cism that modernizing Jews came to affiliate, then knowing the distance of that
outlook from more traditional forms of historical consciousness and how the
distance became so great become the truly crucial problems, ones which Fun-
kenstein did not adequately solve.
These considerations, to conclude, imply that Funkenstein’s case—about
the origins of modern historical reasoning as well as about the affiliation of
Jews with that project—could become fully convincing only if he could ex-
plain not just the original unity that once characterized methodological and
substantive historicism but their breakdown too, the uprooting of profane his-
torical practice from the nourishing soil of sacralized historical expectation.40 I
believe the attachments between the two may have lingered and that in many
milieux methodological historicism may have maintained a productive com-
munion with teleological historicism through much of the nineteenth century.
It is not so much that the slow pace of secularization allowed the persistence of
archaic forms of knowledge; in secular guise, this communion gave the social
theories of Hegel and Marx their extraordinary power—their inspired ability,
never achieved before and rarely repeated since, to combine an interest in ex-
planation of the past with a commitment to a vision of the future. The early
modern period may have seen the beginnings of the breakdown of unity; but it
required late modernity for it to be finally and fatefully completed.
At a memorial service Funkenstein’s student David Biale labeled his teacher
“the last German-Jewish philosopher.”41 Whatever the justice of this title, it is
certainly true that so far as the history of history is concerned Funkenstein’s
approach differed substantially from that current in the Anglo-American world
today. It cast the problem of early modern history at a far more general, philo-
sophical, even metaphysical level than that of simple methodological innova-
tion—and therefore, perhaps, in a mode redolent of some German scholarship
of the golden age.
When understood in relationship to contemporary scholarship, however,
Funkenstein’s work represents not only a counterpoint but also a challenge.
40 See Funkenstein, “Collective Memory and Historical Consciousness,” History & Memory,
1 (1989), 5-26, and Perceptions, chap. 1. Cf. David N. Myers, “Remembering Zakhor: A Super-
commentary,” History & Memory, 4 (1992), 129-48 along with Funkenstein’s short reply.
41 David Biale, “The Last German-Jewish Philosopher,” in Biale et al., Amos Funkenstein:
A Celebration (Berkeley, 1996), rpt. as “The Last German-Jewish Philosopher: Notes towards
an Intellectual Biography of Amos Funkenstein,” Jewish Social Studies, n.s., 6 (1999), 1-5.
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The most important element of his challenge would appear to be the thesis that
the rise of modern historical methods has to be studied together with the rise of
the modern historical consciousness more generally—that the rise of histori-
cism as a methodological principle has to be understood in part as “fallout” of
the transformation of historicism as substantive worldview. For to cite Hegel’s
words again, “It is an internal vital principle common to both that produces
them simultaneously.”
The major significance of early modern European developments, if it is
possible to make Funkenstein’s thesis persuasive, is therefore not the invention
of a new methodological outlook for historical inquiry but rather the separation
of this outlook from a much older substantive framework rooted in theological
premises. But this framework did not die either, for it became secularized into
the great modern philosophies of history of the nineteenth century.
Even after Funkenstein’s pioneering work the breakdown between the two
kinds of historicism remains ill-understood. How the separation happened is a
critical historical question Funkenstein left inadequately answered, with sub-
stantial implications for his theory of the relationship of historical practice to
historical consciousness in the contemporary world.
Historicism cannot remain immune from itself. Professional historians some-
times are willing to accept the insight that the historical method itself has a
history, that the way they presently approach the past implies not the existence
of an exclusive and necessary organon but instead the provisional supremacy
of one method among a plurality of diverse alternatives. Yet they rarely ac-
knowledge so explicitly what this fact suggests, which is that the historical
method may also therefore have a plurality of alternative futures. The modern
historian, operating after the fateful distinction between knowledge about the
past and hopes about the future, often defends the purity of historical investiga-
tion from the contamination of normative commitment. But in light of Fun-
kenstein’s recovery of the original dependence of modern historical thought as
a method on a sense of the ultimate meaning and purpose of history as a pro-
cess, this typical outlook seems contingent (and perhaps even confused).
Habitually mute on the contemporary implications raised by his work,
Funkenstein left open the question whether and how to reunite two approaches
to the past that, like long-lost brothers estranged from one another through the
secularizations of their maturity, have forgotten the interdependence of their
theological origins. Though fatefully separated later, these eventual foes were
born together: this message appears to be the essential contribution of Fun-
kenstein’s career-long inquiry into history.
Columbia University.
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